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NOTES

1964]

The unanimous position reached by the court that a state
is powerless to reserve or protect its local markets is sound. Any
inroad into this concept no matter how justified by a balance of
interests would open the door to trade barriers and other economic retaliation among the states. The commerce clause stands
for the proposition that economic prosperity lies in a federal
common market and not in the state as an independent trade
unit. It may well be that Florida producers require a large
share of the Florida beverage milk sales to be financially stable,
but this may be equally true for producers from other states
who sell milk in Florida. By virtue of the commerce clause, the
decision whether the plight of the dairy industry requires that
the interests of out-of-state producers be subordinated to those
of local producers should be committed to Congress where the
needs of the dairy industry of the nation as a whole are represented, and not to the individual states who are clearly incapable
of impartial resolution of such conflicting economic interests.
William Shelby McKenzie

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW - TAXATION IMMUNITY OF IMPORTS
IMPORTS FOR SALE V. IMPORTS FOR MANUFACTURE

-

Plaintiff newspaper imported newsprint from Canada, maintaining an average inventory equal to a thirty-five day supply.
prices is well settled. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S.
346 (1939); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). The
distance between the permitted economic regulation in Eisenberg and the prohibited one in Hood is close and gives the best indication of the outer barrier for
state regulation. A state may enact reasonable legislation to alleviate a local
evil even though it places some burden on interstate commerce, provided it does
not discriminate against that commerce-i.e., provided it places an equal burden
on all intrastate commerce as well. The producer price-fixing scheme in Eisenberg
required all instate and outstate purchasers to pay the minimum price. But
when the regulation goes one step further and attempts to curtail interstate
commerce to stimulate intrastate commerce or curtail both interstate and intrastate commerce to protect commerce in one area of the state, then the regulation
must fall under the commerce clause. In Hood the state tried to protect the
Greenwich area processors by excluding other New York and out-of-state
processors.
For a thorough discussion of the many ways in which a state may use its
sanitary regulations as an economic barrier, see Hutt, Restrictions on the Free
Movement of Fluid illilk under Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 37 U. Det. L. J.
525, 541-53 (1.960). Even though the court appears to have reached a solidary
position on economic regulation, it will still have to tangle with the balance-ofinterests in situations in which the state has discriminatory sanitary regulations.
At least when nondiscriminatory alternatives are available, the state cannot erect
such barriers. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See Minnesota
v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
But see Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
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The city of Denver assessed an ad valorem property tax on the
entire supply which plaintiff paid under protest, later suing for
a refund on the ground the tax violated the import-export clause
of the United States Constitution. The trial court upheld the
assessed tax but only for that portion of the newsprint needed
in current operation; it held that current operational needs were
to be determined by multiplying daily requirements by shipping
time from Canada. On appeal the Supreme Court of Colorado
affirmed. Held, the portion of imported newsprint required to
meet current operational needs was put to the use for which imported, and therefore was subject to taxation although it remained in the original packages until ready for the presses.
City & County of Denver v. Denver Publishing Co., 387 P.2d 48
(Colo. 1963).
The Constitution guarantees imports immunity from state
taxation,' but a state has power to tax property within its borders. 2 Difficulties arise in determining the ambit of protection
granted by the Constitution. Dicta by Chief Justice Marshall
in Brown v. Maryland' suggested three possible criteria, each of
which was subsequently utilized, for determining when the state
may properly exercise its power of taxation. The import may
be taxed when sold in the taxing state, 4 when the original package is broken, 5 and when it is put to the use for which imported.0 Imported inventories for manufacturing purposes were
first held beyond the taxing power of the state on analogy to
the immunity retained by imported inventories held for sale.7
This standard of immunity was subsequently restricted in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers8 by the decision that
imported inventories essential to "current operational needs"
were "put to the use for which ... imported" and therefore lost
their immunity.9 There was strong dissent on the ground that
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ....
"
2. See Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928); American
Steel Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1904) ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73
(1850).
3. 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
4. Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. 110 (1868).
5. May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
6. Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Macinerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928).
7. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 667 (1945) : "We do not
perceive upon what grounds it can be thought that imports for manufacture lose
their character as imports any sooner or more readily than imports for sale. The
Constitutional . . . immunity . . . is the same in both cases."
8. 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
9. Id. at 544, 548.
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this amounted to an overruling sub silentio of the entire prior
jurisprudence.' 0
The effect of Youngstown has been to create a double standard for determining the taxability of imports. Cases involving
imported inventories for sale have ignored Youngstown and
have followed former rules of taxation immunity," whereas
those concerned with imported manufacturing inventories have
invoked the "current operational needs" test to allow state taxation. 12
The instant case is well aligned with its precursors in both
rationale and result. It illustrates the administrative problem of
the Youngstown rule - determination of current operational
needs. The court glossed over this by affirming the method used
by the district court, and emphasized this determination must
be made on the facts of each individual case.' 8 The court did not
consider, however, the more fundamental question why should
imported inventories for manufacturing uses be taxable while
those for sale are not. A comparison of the instant case with an
earlier Michigan one' 4 illustrates the incongruity of this dichotomy. In both cases the municipality assessed a personal property tax on imported Canadian newsprint even though still in the
original packages. Both importers claimed immunity via the
import-export clause, but only the Michigan state tax was struck
down. The only distinction between the two cases is that the
10. Id. at 553 (dissenting opinion).
11. See Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 18 Ill.
2d 445, 448, 164 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1960): "There is nothing to indicate that the
Supreme Court has changed the view it has taken with regard to imports held
for sale."; H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, 15 Wis. 2d 330, 334, 112
N.W.2d 914, 916 (1962). Youngstown clearly did not abolish "original package"
doctrine as applied to goods imported for sale. Standard-Triumph Motor Co. v.
City of Houston, 220 F. Supp. 732, 734 (1963). "Intended use" test is applied
primarily in cases of imports for use rather than imports for sale. Tricon, Inc.
v. King County, 60 Wash. 2d 392, 396, 374 P.2d 174, 176 (1962) : "We do not
think the Supreme Court has indicated . . . that goods imported for resale . . .
lose their character as imports immune from state taxation when they become
a part of the importer's current inventory of goods held for sale." James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Department of Revenue, 367 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1963).
12. See South Coast Fisheries, Inc. v. Department of Fish & Game, 213 Cal.
App. 2d 325, 28 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1963) ; Continental Coffee Co. v. Bowers, 174
Ohio St. 435, 439, 189 N.W.2d 901, 905 (1963) : "Once an import is irrevocably
committed to supply the current operating needs of a manufacturer and is being
used to supply its daily operating needs the status as an import is lost."
13. 387 P.2d at 53: " 'There is no rigid and inflexible rule which can be laid
down to determine the "current operational needs" of a taxpayer. This is an area
wherein the policy of the law dictates ad hoc determinations based on the facts
presented in each particular case.' "
14. Detroit v. Lake Superior Paper Co., 202 Mich. 22, 167 N.W. 852 (1918).
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Michigan tax was on imported inventories held for sale rather
than for use as in the instant case. 15
It is submitted that there is no just basis for allowing immunity to inventories for sale and denying it to those for manufacturing uses. The imported inventories are as essential to
"current operational needs" in the one case as they are in the
other. Imports for sale are as much "used to supply" needed
inventories and therefore "put to the use for which imported"
as are those for manufacturing purposes. In effect the "current
operational needs" test is discriminating against the manufacturer in favor of the seller. As was pointed out by one of the
dissenting Justices in Youngstown 6 there is even less reason
for denying the immunity to goods imported for manufacture
as the state retains the right to tax the manufactured product.
It becomes apparent, therefore, that the cases, by sanctioning
immunity to imports for sale and by denying it to those for
manufacture, have created an unjust dichotomy. The instant
case, although correctly invoking the Youngstown rule, works
unmerited prejudice against the taxpayer merely because he
chooses to use a product to effectuate a later sale rather than to
sell initially.
Paul H. Du6

CRIMINAL LAW-

BILL OF PARTICULARS

A person charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.' To secure this right the district attorney may be required to furnish a bill of particulars to the defendant, supplying him with the necessary information. 2 Whether the district attorney must furnish the bill of particulars rests
within the discretion of the trial judge, 3 provided that he may
not arbitrarily refuse to order particulars necessary to the ade15. The tax was held invalid even though the goods were essential to current
operational needs, viz., "to insure the fulfillment of its contracts . . . to supply
said papers with the necessary paper to print said newspapers." Id. at 24, 167
N.W. at 853.
16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 563 (1959).
1. LA. CoNsT. art I, § 10.
2. LA. R.S. 15:235, 288 (1950).
3. State v. Williams, 230 La. 1059, 89 So.2d 898 (1956).

